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The Return of the Man with Two Hats:In (Reluctant) Appreciation of Phil Hellmuth
By Michael Craig

At the World Series of Poker Tournament of Champions on ESPN this Christmas Eve, you will see Phil Hellmuth wearing two hats: an UltimateBet.com cap facing forward and his Phil Hellmuth logo hat facing back. If you ignore the conceit of inventing and wearing your initials as a logo, the combination sends an interesting fashion message. Phil is, after all, the archetype of the tournament pro who is now part salesman, part poker player.

I showed up at Caesars Palace on November 8 to root for Mike Matusow, who seemed star-crossed in these big events. Looking ahead for signs that might predict the outcome, I thought the two hats didn’t auger well for Hellmuth.

Phil the Pitchman would like to think his best days are in front of him, as the forward-facing UltimateBet.com hat symbolized. But what about the Phil Hellmuth hat in reverse? Was Phil sending a message that his days as an iconic talent were behind him?

That would be the opinion of most casual followers of tournament poker. Since snagging two bracelets in the 2003 World Series, Phil has had a dry spell, distinguishing himself at big events by arriving late and leaving early, punctuating his exits with some rant. (The NBC heads-up championship last spring was an exception.) Everyone has an opinion about Phil Hellmuth and most of them aren’t very nice:

• Phil has lost his passion;
• Tournaments have become big enough for the cash-game pros to move in, and they are better than Hellmuth;
• The hordes of hungry Internet players have moves Phil has not applied himself to countering; and
• Phil Hellmuth was never that great.

This last has to gall Hellmuth the most. Nine bracelets and no respect?

I was predisposed to underrate Phil Hellmuth as a poker player. When I introduced myself to Phil at the World Series and gave him a copy of my book, The Professor, the Banker, and the Suicide King, he said, “A friend told me I was conspicuously absent from your book.” I was too surprised by his greeting to respond, but he was lucky to be omitted.

When I asked high-stakes pros last year about the rumor that Hellmuth was schooling Andy Beal, several said they would much rather play poker against Phil Hellmuth than Andy Beal. A few said it as a compliment to Beal, but others weren’t so diplomatic. Several were dismissive of Phil’s skills and a few implicitly conditioned their cooperation on the prospect that a book about the cash-game pros would elevate them to the level they deserved. Specifically, above Phil Hellmuth.

There is also the matter of Phil’s on-camera assessment of his own game. Because nobody could be as good as Phil claims he is, any relevant analysis of his own play becomes difficult to separate from the bluster. I remember, in the early Eighties, someone in baseball describing Reggie Jackson’s oratory: if he spoke out in favor of the Bill of Rights for ten minutes, anyone listening would want to repeal them. Phil sounds like that sometimes.

Consequently, the Tournament of Champions was a real eye-opener for me. Even though Hellmuth did not win, it was hard to watch his performance carefully without developing an appreciation for his poker talent.

Phil started the final table with the chip lead. There are several general strategies the chip leader can employ, and Hellmuth obviously decided to play tight. This was consistent with his overall philosophy of playing quality hands and avoiding risk. This was nothing revolutionary but with TV final tables increasingly turning into aggressive all-in contests, it was interesting to see a pro execute a different strategy.

Mike Matusow, who started in second chip position, played the more typical aggressive style: raising a lot of pots, picking up blinds and antes and using his skill to get away from weak hands (and the deception of raising with any two cards to get paid on his big hands). Phil’s strategy wouldn’t allow him to pick up a lot of blinds, and he could be prey to a thief like Matusow. But Hellmuth stayed out of trouble this way. He traded the lead for avoiding confrontations, even those where he probably better cards but could get outdrawn.

Playing this way, Hellmuth eventually gave up his chip lead (and did he ever hear about that from Matusow) but he accomplished exactly what he wanted. He was never in danger of losing a lot of chips and when the tournament broke for dinner, he was in second position, but now he had only four opponents. At dinner with Mike Matusow, several of his friends repeated his afternoon full of taunts about Phil. “Hellmuth has no chance.” “He’s afraid to play a hand against you, Mikey.” “He’s a legend in his own mind.”

Mike didn’t want to hear any of that. “Phil is playing so well right now. If I can’t get him off his game, I don’t know how I’m going to beat him.” That is how Matusow really felt. He was brimming with confidence, certain he was playing his best poker, but in his heart, he wasn’t sure it if would be enough. Because of Phil Hellmuth.

When it came down to three-handed, Phil Hellmuth had the chip lead. In a finish loaded with great play, Phil made a read on Hoyt Corkins on one hand that has to rank as one of his all-time best. As midnight approached, Hellmuth limped in the small blind. Corkins, in the big blind, raised (as he frequently did). Both players checked the flop and the turn. Phil checked the river, with the board reading 9-9-8-7-8. Corkins bet $60,000, putting nearly $200,000 in the pot. Phil Hellmuth called the bet with king-high.

And he won. Corkins had bet out with queen-high.

All three pros made some remarkable reads. But with Phil starting the king-high hand with the chip lead and making that kind of play it looked like he was going to win, leaving in his wake a field of top tournament pros, each of whom brought his “A” game to the final table. A persuasive argument could be made that perhaps Hellmuth was nearly as good as he claimed.

Phil Hellmuth’s play is a reminder that a large part of winning a tournament comes not just from “pro plays,” but from making the fewest mistakes. Hellmuth put himself in a position where it was almost impossible for him to make an expensive mistake. Unfortunately, another part of winning a tournament is getting lucky at the right time, and Phil, unlike his talented opponents, didn’t get lucky when he needed it.

Just a few hands after making that phenomenal read, Hellmuth reraised Hoyt Corkins, going all-in with ace-queen. With it costing $30,000 per round and Hoyt raising Phil’s blinds with, it seemed, any two cards, it was unquestionably a correct move. But Corkins had two aces, and Phil went from chip leader to the brink of elimination.

Both Matusow and Corkins, at some point during a day of brilliant play, had all their chips in the middle with the worst hand. Hoyt, early in the day, was covered by an opponent with ace-ace when he put in all his chips with queen-queen. But he caught a queen. At the stroke of midnight, Mike Matusow got all his chips in with ace-queen, only to run into Corkins’ ace-king. The queen popped up for Mike, too.

But Phil didn’t get that kind of luck on the one hand where he needed it, and that may have been the difference between third place and first place. Clearly, both Matusow and Corkins were playing great and, even if Hellmuth got an equivalent piece of luck, he could have still lost. But on a long day with all the top players at their best, you have to expect to sometime have a big hand yet run into a bigger hand. It happened to all of them, and Phil was the only one upon whom fortune failed to smile.

Even so, Phil Hellmuth didn’t give up. He played on for another forty-five minutes, displaying real grit on a night when his best starting hand coincided with his loose opponent’s pocket aces. He soldiered on even after losing a big chunk of his depleted stack when Corkins made his all-star read, calling Phil’s check-raise on the turn and sizable bet on the river with eight-four – second pair, weak kicker – with the board showing three clubs and obvious straight possibilities.

Hellmuth even won over the crowd. Throughout the afternoon and evening, he would occasionally walk away from the table and commiserate with his dad, sitting in front of press row. (At one point, Phil Sr. got a big laugh when his son came over to complain and he said in a loud voice, “Just play.”) When he was struggling, down to his last few chips, he stood up between hands and called out to his dad, “I’m not giving up. I won’t ever give up!”

It was hardly Churchillian, but I still found it moving. Despite all the other things Phil Hellmuth, Jr. is or aspires to be – poker pro, author, endorser, crybaby, expert – part of him is still a kid who wants to show his dad that he can be tough if he has to be. This was a character worth rooting for, much more than the one who busts out and rants about how he got unlucky and how badly everyone else played. (He did some of that, too.)

Of course, in the end, without that great piece of luck when he needed it, the blinds and antes forced him all-in, and he finished third. But he left us with a great show and a textbook example of how to play solid big-stack poker, a classic demonstration of a technique different than the dominant strategy seen these days at televised final tables.

Phil Hellmuth has a bright future away from the poker table: more endorsements, books, videos, and seminars. But he made it clear at the final table of the Tournament of Champions that he has some great poker to look forward to as well.

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About the Author:
Michael Craig is the author of The Professor, the Banker, and the Suicide King: Inside the Richest Poker Game of All Time.

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