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Poker Articles
Football: A Game of Odds and Inches
By Nolan Dalla
A few years ago, there was an NFL game where one team had a three point lead with less than two minutes remaining (Dallas at Philadelphia, Dec. 10, 1995). The team had the ball on their own 40 yard line and faced a critical fourth down decision. 99 times out of 100, most NFL teams would punt in such a situation. Instead, the team made a stunning decision to go for the first down -- and failed. The opposing team took possession, kicked a field goal for the tie, and went on to win the game in overtime. The coach's decision to go for a first down (instead of punting) led to a storm of controversy. Sports fans jammed radio call-in shows and denounced the coach's decision. Some fans were so angry they wanted the coach to be fired.
David Sklansky, a respected gambling theorist, saw the game and later wrote about the incident. He added an interesting twist to the debate. Sklansky concluded that going for the first down was the correct decision. His conclusion was based -- not on conventional football wisdom -- but on a series of mathematical calculations that weighed the odds of each possible outcome. Sklansky explained how probability-based decisions (more precisely, weighing the potential consequences of all the available options) apply not only to poker and gambling situations, but to sports, as well.
The idea that football strategy should be based on some rather esoteric gambling principles might arouse skepticism. But most football decisions involve little more than the evaluation of risk. Play-calling is based on what is believed to have the greatest chance of succeeding. Say what you will about multi-million dollar athletes, but good coaching win football games. Good coaches beat bad coaches -- it's that simple. Every NFL team generally has the same measure of strength and speed. All teams have an equal number of players with roughly the same muscle mass, and an equal number of players with world-class speed. All teams have access to the same talent pool of athletes, and spends about the same on player salaries (through revenue sharing). It usually comes down to which teams have more experience and better coaching.
Football has fittingly been called "a game of inches," an expression that unveils the fine line that often separates victory from defeat. Coaches that understand how to pick-up every possible inch on the field of play, or secure every last second of opportunity from the game clock, have a clear advantage over coaches who ignore these precepts. Perhaps if more NFL coaches approached decisions the way a savvy gambler looks at his craft -- that is, looking for the slightest edge at all times -- they would run a few more plays, score a few more points, and perhaps even win a few more games.
With football season about to begin, I thought it would be interesting to look at a number of common mistakes you are likely to see in any NFL game. All of these mistakes seem to ignore probability-based principles:
- Trying to establish a running game -- For 60 years, the conventional wisdom among NFL coaches was that to be successful, an offense had to run the ball first to set up the passing game. In 1979, Bill Walsh took over the San Francisco 49ers and changed all that. Walsh discovered the reverse was also true. Passing could be used to set up the running game. Walsh figured if defenses were stretched across the field struggling to cover pass routes, fewer defensive players were stacked on the line of scrimmage. This, in effect, opened up a running attack. The "West Coast" offense was born and Walsh's (and protégé, George Siefert's) 49ers went on the win five Super Bowls during the 80s and 90s. Teams that adopted Walsh's offensive philosophy (Denver under Mike Shanahan, Green Bay under Mike Holmgren, and St. Louis under Dick Vermeil) have won the last four NFL championships. Enough said.
- Punting when inside the opponent's 40 yard line -- When facing a 4th down inside the opponent's 40, how many times have you seen a team punt, rather than attempting a long-distance field goal? This happens far more often than it should. At first glance, the decision to punt seems justified based on improving field position. But all too often, this backfires. Punters frequently kick the ball too far; the ball rolls into the end zone, which means the ball is placed at the 20 yard line. The end result is a net gain of only 15-20 yards. Far more important, the team threw away a three point opportunity. In any game, three points are much more significant than 15-20 net yards that might be gained from punting. Even if the field goal has only a marginal chance of success, it's usually the right decision. An exception would be in cases of foul weather (such as a strong wind) or a very weak field goal kicker.
- Poor clock management -- In a close game, the team with the lead has possession of the ball. The losing team is desperate to get the ball back for one final chance to score. The losing team allows the clock to continue running, all the way down to the two-minute warning (Note: The clock stops automatically at 2:00). When play resumes, the losing team starts to use its time-outs. This is a mistake. The losing team should use one time-out just prior to the two-minute warning. This way, the offensive team is forced to run at least one more play before the clock stops automatically. When the clock hits 2:00, the following down will be coming up -- which means the defensive team usually has an extra ten seconds, or so (the approximate time it takes to run one play) to get the ball back and score. Even good coaches commonly make this mistake. Ten seconds might not seem significant, but in a very close game it could provide an extra play or two in the closing seconds....which is sometimes the difference between winning and losing.
- Quarterbacks intentionally spiking the ball -- When a quarterback throws an incomplete pass, the clock stops automatically. So, in the final minute of a game, the team that's behind often "spikes" the ball to stop the clock. Conserving time is certainly important, but the far better option is to throw a quick pass to a receiver near the sideline designed to try and gain a few extra yards. If the pass is incomplete, the clock will stop anyway. If the pass is caught, it could be another ten yards or so closer to scoring. This play is virtually a total freeroll. But all too often, you see quarterbacks panic. They run up to the line of scrimmage, spike the ball, thus wasting a down. Then, a few plays later disaster strikes when the team must turn the ball over on downs because a critical down was wasted. Spiking the ball should only be used in an absolute emergency -- such as in the closing seconds to set up a field goal attempt when there are no time-outs left. Otherwise, the team is forfeiting its precious opportunities to score.
- Kicking a field goal at the opponent's one yard line -- On 4th and goal at the one yard line, it's almost always better to go for the touchdown, except in low-scoring defensive struggles, or very late in the game. Yet, most coaches are conservative in this spot and kick a field goal. This is wrong. Even if the touchdown attempt fails, the opposing team takes over the ball on its own one yard line. The opposing team isn't likely to do much offensively and will probably run up the middle just to get out of the shadow of its end zone. The other team will very likely get the ball back with excellent field position following a punt, which puts the team right back into field goal range. This is the time to play field position, with a "freeroll" of four extra points if a touchdown is scored (Note: It might even be advisable to go for the touchdown on 4th and 2, but that depends more on the relative strengths of each team). Finally, this point is compounded by the fact that if the field goal attempt fails, the opposing team gets the ball back at the 20 yard line -- essentially, what amounts to a 19-yard gain for the opponent.
- Using a conventional running attack in short-yardage situations -- Which is more difficult to stop -- a 220-pound running back, or a 320- pound offensive lineman falling forward in a pile drive? The answer has everything to do with physics. In 1985, the Chicago Bears used a second-rate lineman named William "the Refrigerator" Perry to run the ball in short-yardage situations. The results were dramatic. Almost every time Perry lined-up near the goal line, he crashed into the end zone and scored. It's a total mystery why other teams haven't adopted this proven short-yardage formula. Teams continue to use 220-pound running backs, who are at a serious weight and strength disadvantage. Even if the 320-pound lineman doesn't get the ball and serves as a "decoy," that's enough to be effective.
- Poorly constructed hand-offs -- Let's examine the mechanics of a hand-off in short yardage situations: First, the quarterback takes the ball from under center. Next, he steps back and pivots around. Then, he takes another step backward, and hands the ball off to the running back. By the time the ball is finally in the running back's hands, the ball is as much as four yards behind the actual line of scrimmage. At that instant, it's no longer 3rd and 1. It might as well be 3rd and 5, since the running back must make up five total yards to get the first down. Ball carriers in this situation are frequently stopped at the line for no gain (and sometimes even lose yards). A quarterback draw or sending a powerful lineman over the top with the ball (see previous point) is almost always the better call.
- Conservative play-calling -- How many times have you seen a team thoroughly dominate a game in the first half, only to get conservative in the second half and eventually lose the game? There's a natural complacency that sets in when one team is way ahead. But, if a game plan was successful enough to build a big lead over the other team, why make changes? This leads to another common mistake:
- The "Prevent Defense" -- Prevent defenses are designed to reduce the chances of a big play (or touchdown) occurring, tacitly agreeing to give up multiple chunks of short yardage. Prevent defenses usually employ three-man fronts in exchange for near blanket coverage down field, which means there is little or no pass rush on the quarterback. Offenses routinely take advantage of prevent defenses by throwing short passes which moves the ball down field methodically (consuming valuable time in the process.). Offenses that might have been completely shut down for much of the game suddenly come to life. The question again is -- if a strategy has proven effective for most of the game, why change it in the closing minutes?
As you can see, football involves much more in terms of calculating probability than meets the eye. Coaches that apply the tenets of a winning gambler are more likely to be winning coaches -- all other factors being equal.
Find more articles and lessons by Nolan Dalla by joining PokerSchool Online!
This article was previously published in Card Player Magazine. Nolan Dalla can be reached at nolandalla@aol.com.
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