Player's Stories

Short-Handed Poker: Adjusting to Real Players
by Jason Pohl

I love poker theory. But theory and reality are not the same. We know by analyzing reasonable assumptions and different scenarios that a tighter strategy coupled with an aggressive defense is the most profitable preflop strategy for defending the blinds. But how much would our strategy change as the tightness of the big blind changed? Would it be linear (i.e. if the button raised only 50% of the time, should we call half as often as we would against a blind stealer who raised 100% of the time?) The answer is 'no.' Effective big blind strategy considers post-flop profitability more than preflop percentages. In other words, implied odds are more important than preflop pot odds.

The Blind Stealer

Every single theory we have discussed so far has assumed a preflop raiser attacking the blinds 100% of the time. While it is true that some players are super-aggressive blind stealers, it is still very rare to find somebody who truly does raise every single time. But what about the aggressive button raising with 75% of hands? That's still a lot of raises, and it eliminates only the worst possible holdings from an opponent's arsenal. The following hands make up about one-fourth of all possible holdings: {32, 42, 52, 62, 72, 73, 82, 83, 84, 92, 93, 94, 95, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6o, J2o, J3o, J4o}.

As I mentioned in the intro, the answer does not lie strictly with pot odds. If it did, you could say "Hmmm...I call 45% of the time against a button who raises 100% of the time, so I'll call three-fourths as often against this type of blind stealer. Three-fourths of 45% means I only call 33.75% of the time." But such a strategy would reduce profit significantly, because it fails to consider the profitability of hands after the flop. When we measured what hands to play against a preflop maniac, our primary concern was the ability to showdown successfully, especially since the blinds have inferior position. In other words, we avoided small cards and hands with little potential.

We've already demonstrated a few ways a smaller hand can be in trouble. Middle or bottom pair continuously must make a best estimate of whether the opposition has a better hand or a bluffing hand, and a good player with position takes advantage to save or make extra bets (not to mention extra pots).

Example 1: $10/20 3-handed. Button raised, small blind folded, and big blind called.

• $45 in pot. Flop 6h 8c Jd
• Big Blind has 7s 6s.

Let's assume the button would call or raise the flop with a pair or better, overcards, or a straight draw. Against an aggressive bettor, many also call with Ace-high or hands with backdoor potential such as KdTd. Clearly, the big blind is in trouble if there is any action after the flop. Most solid players with the button will exploit position to attack the pot at some point in the hand, with a higher pair or with a semibluff.

• If the big blind gives up too often, it could be costly.
• If the big blind passively checks and calls, the price is valuable free cards and lost pots to a hand that would have folded on the turn.
• If the big blind decides to stick it out but competes against a better hand, it will be charged the maximum.

The goal of the big blind is to avoid these decisions by maximizing the likelihood of being ahead after the flop. Hands such as 76s remain playable for three reasons: variance of play, straight potential, and flush potential. But 76s is still marginal, especially out of position, because the low rank is such a significant disadvantage.

So, what adjustments do you make to a player raising 75% of the time? You begin by folding the most marginal hands you would have called before. Again, I'd fold these hands specifically because I want to avoid making a pair against a higher made hand, and if my opponent has dropped the lowest quarter of hands, the chances of a small pair winning has decreased markedly.

Should the big blind not reraise as often? After all, the button is now about 1/4 more likely to be raising a legitimate monster. While the big blind should make an adjustment, it should not be substantial. The rationale for reraising is to affect future play, both postflop and on future hands. A reraise shifts the initiative to the big blind, and it increases the chance the button will fold after the flop. By taking initiative, bluffs and semibluffs are more profitable, and since the majority of flops will miss even two big cards, the ability to take down pots without a fight is a clear advantage.

So, stay tight and stay aggressive. Drop the most marginal holdings (e.g. call with 5% fewer holdings) and adjust to the opponent's skill; but don't adjust drastically. Postflop play is more important.

The Non-Stealing Button (or Small Blind)

Another common and difficult opponent is the seemingly more reasonable player who raises with a significant range of hands, but does not attempt steals with less favorable holdings such as J7o, QXs, KXo, etc. In my experience, it is very common to find players who will raise with pocket pairs, any Ace, any suited King, any two cards over Eight, suited connectors down to 43s, as well as a hodgepodge of other hands such as 97s, 86s, 75s, and J7s. In other words, they raise with about the same types of hands that we are suggesting should be played from the big blind against a blind stealer (plus maybe a few more). This isn't really a coincidence; the whole reason the top 40-50% of hands are playable in the big blind is that they fare well postflop. Of course, the same reasoning would apply from the button.

I believe it is clear that the button is giving up some solid preflop profit by limiting his raising to only 40-50% of hands, but it does provide a dilemma to a player defending his blinds. On one extreme, we know how to handle a habitual blind stealer. On the other hand, it is easy to counter somebody raising with only the top 20% of hands (i.e. fold all but the best hands.) But against an opponent raising 40-50% of the time, the choices are not so clear.

To best examine the problem, we consider two factors, neither of which is purely based on mathematics. First, the button is far more likely to have a premium hand. Reraising with KT or QT is not such a good idea, unless the button plays significantly tight after the flop against a reraise. So, it is a good idea to reraise with a more reasonable range such as the top 10% of hands (AA-99, AK-AT, KQ, KJs, KTs, QJs, JTs)-the adjustment is more significant because the button is far more likely to have a hand that he cannot be persuaded to fold.

Second, reducing play of marginal hands is common sense. Playing bad cards in bad position is simply unprofitable. How much you cut is still contingent on postflop play. If the button is a tight, passive player after the flop (regularly checks when missing the flop, folds too often, and/or fails to earn extra value bets regularly), the big blind can call quite often. It is my opinion that if you are lucky enough to find such an opponent, you can continue to call with up to 45% of hands. The marginal cards will become profitable due to successful bluffs and semibluffs' profits, as well as saved big bets when the button fails to maximize. However, such tight, passive players don't last long in shorthanded play. Typically, you'll find an opponent putting the hand to the test on the flop and/or turn. To combat the regular bluffing and semibluffing, the big blind needs better starting hands that are more likely to hold up to win a showdown.

What are "better starting hands" in shorthanded play? Big cards--suited connectors and small pocket pairs are still inherently vulnerable to bluffs and semibluffs. Smaller cards remain profitable against other vulnerable hands (or many opponents of course), but they are marginal at best against a more legitimate preflop raiser. In my opinion, a good list of hands to play against an opponent raising 40-50% of the time is listed below.

• AA-55
• AK-A3, A2s
• KQ-K9, K8s-K7s
• QJ-Q9, Q8s
• JT-J9, J8s
• T9, 98, 87s-54s

The hands above add up to 444 hand combinations out of a possible 1326, so the big blind would still call with around 33% of hands. Even though the button has changed from raising 100% of the time to 50% of the time, the big bind has adjusted from calling 45% to 33%, a much smaller dropoff. There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the smaller difference in proper big blind strategy.

1. Proper big blind defense relies on postflop expectations to determine its success.
2. In a heads-up match, the button should raise as much as 75-80% of the time to optimize profit (all things being equal).

And so, our preflop strategy is complete. While it demanded a multifaceted examination to formulate our plan, the implementation is fairly simple. Tight and aggressive, the big blind should attack back with strong hands and try to reduce the button's positional advantage. If you have any questions, comments, or ideas for another topic, please email me at Jason@PokerPages.com. Until the next article, good luck!